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CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-UNION ORGANIZERS ON
DEPARTMENT STORE PARKING LOT CONVICTED
UNDER STATE TRESPASS STATUTE
Defendants, nonemployee union organizers of local 1550, Retail Clerks
International Association, AFL-CIO, entered upon a parking lot leased by
Sears Roebuck and Company and adjacent to their store for the sole pur-
pose of passing out union leaflets to the employees of Sears. Sears leased
the lot for use of its employees and customers and does not permit any
type of soliciting without its permission. The store superintendent in-
formed the defendants of this fact and ordered them to leave three times,
the third time warning them he would call the police. Each time the de-
fendants refused to leave. The defendants were arrested and subsequently
convicted of criminal trespass under the Illinois statute which makes such
a refusal to leave, when one is unlawfully upon the land of another, a
misdemeanor.' At no time did the defendant union organizers apply to
the National Labor Relations Board for a determination of their rights to
be on the property.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois, the defendants contended
that the trial court did not have jurisdiction because Congress, by its
enactment of the National Labor Relations Act 2 and its extensive amend-
ments,3 has deprived the states of the power to interfere with the labor
activity involved by this type of trespass prosecution. The Supreme Court
of Illinois held that because of the threat of violence created when the
defendants repeatedly refused to leave, the state was justified, in the
interest of maintaining domestic peace, to enforce its criminal trespass
statute. People v. Goduto, 21 111. 2d 605, 174 N.E. 2d 385 (1961).
In Amalgamated Meat Cutters, AFL v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc.,4 the United
States Supreme Court expressly reserved its opinion as to whether or not
a state can enforce an action under a no trespass rule where no effort has
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38 S 565 (1959) "Whoever . . . is unlawfully upon the enclosed
or unenclosed land of another and is notified to depart therefrom by the owner, or
occupant, or by his agent or servant, and neglects or refuses to do so ... shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor...."
2 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958).
3 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) 61 Stat. 136 (1947); Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffin Act) 73 Stat. 519
(1959), 29 U.S.C. S 151.
4 353 U.S. 20 (1957).
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been made to invoke the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Board. The case came to the Supreme Court after the Ohio state courts
had enjoined a union from picketing certain stores on the grounds that the
picketing was an unfair labor practice and also because it was being per-
formed on property owned or leased by the employer. It was held by the
United States Supreme Court that since only the National Labor Rela-
tions Board can determine whether a labor activity constitutes an unfair
labor practice, the Ohio state courts lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court reserved its opinion of the injunction against trespass because it
found that the Ohio courts had proceeded on the erroneous premise that
they could reach the union's conduct in its entirety, and the action was
therefore not aimed at trespass.5 When the Illinois courts convicted the
defendants in the Goduto case, it was the first time that any state had
exercised its power over persons engaged in a labor activity solely by
means of a trespass statute. This naturally raises the problem of the pro-
priety of this action by the Illinois state courts.
In many matters concerning labor activities, the question of just what
has been left to the states and what has been delegated by the National
Labor Relations Act to the exclusive control of federal agencies and
courts is not yet clear. In International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales,0
the court stated that:
The statutory implications concerning what has been taken from the states and
what has been left to them are of a Delphic nature, to be translated into con-
creteness by the process of litigating elucidation. 7
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act states that employees
have the right to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, self organization, and
the right to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing.8 Section 8(a) enumerates a series of unfair labor practices of
employers, and section 8(b) lists unfair labor practices of unions.9 When-
ever an activity is protected by section 7 or prohibited by section 8, the
states lack jurisdiction over this activity.10 If the activity is arguably sub-
ject to section 7 or section 8, the states must yield to the primary jurisdic-
tion of the National Labor Relations Board for a clear determination of
5 Id. at 25, 26.
6 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
7 Id. at 619.
8 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
9 49 Stat. 452 (1935); Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) 61 Stat.
140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1958).
10 Garner v. Teamsters Union, Local 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953); Weber v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955); Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1959).
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the question of whether the activity has been pre-empted by federal legis-
lation." Under section 701 (a) of the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959,12 which amended the National Labor Relations
Act, the states are permitted to exercise their jurisdiction over any labor
dispute which the National Labor Relations Board, by ad hoc decision or
rule, elects not to take jurisdiction. This amendment eliminates the "no
man's land" which was created when the National Labor Relations Board
refused to hear cases, even though they involved activities protected by
section 7 or prohibited by section 8, because they did not meet certain
standards set up by the Board. Before this amendment the states could not
take jurisdiction in these cases because these activities were still considered
to be solely within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Board.' 3 This amendment was not brought before the court in the
Goduto case, but the Illinois Supreme Court assumed that section 701 (a)
did not grant the state jurisdiction in this particular case. However, the
state courts have consistently been allowed to assert jurisdiction over labor
activities when such activities have involved violence 14 or a threat of vio-
lence. 15 There was no violence in the present case but the Illinois courts,
in their examination of trespass, found that the defendants' repeated re-
fusals to leave constituted an imminent threat of violence.
Trespass was a crime at common law only when it was accompanied by,
or tended to produce, a breach of the peace.' 6 This was a recognition by
the common law that besides being an invasion of private property rights,
this type of trespass was a threat to society. The statutes which make
trespass a crime also have as a primary goal the prevention of such
threats, 17 and secondarily, the protection of property rights. Criminal
sanctions are proper in both of these areas. Furthermore, the owner or
occupier of land has the right to use force to remove trespassers.' 8 Upon
examination of what might occur if the individual owner or occupier at-
tempted to remove trespassers by force,19 the Illinois Supreme Court, in
11 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
12 (Landrum-Griffin Act) S 701 (a) 73 Stat. 541, 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 153 (c)
(1958).
1 Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
14 United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954); United
Auto. Workers v. WERB, 351 U.S. 266 (1956).
15 Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957).
16 Busick v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 201 IMI. App. 63 (1915).
17 Dotson v. State, 6 Cold. 545 (Tenn. 1869).
18 Woodman v. Howell, 45 Ill. 367 (1867); Long v. People, 102 Ill. 331 (1882); People
v. Hart, 156 111. App. 523 (1910); People v. Roote, 170 Ill. App. 608 (1912).
19 Marshall Field & Co. v. NLRB, 200 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1953).
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the Goduto case, found a situation of imminent violence is present where
one is unlawfully upon the land of another and refuses to leave.
In the San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,20 one of the land-
mark cases of the United States Supreme Court's Delphic approach, it was
recognized that the states have the power to keep order within their bor-
ders. This case originated in California where a businessman was suing a
union for damages suffered by his business as a result of allegedly unfair
labor practices, namely, picketing and secondary boycotts imposed by a
union supposedly not authorized to represent his employees. The Supreme
Court of California granted damages, under a state tort statute providing
for such, but on appeal to the United States Supreme Court this decision
was reversed. The Supreme Court held that the granting of damages in
such cases would be as effective in controlling union activities as the
granting of injunctions. It further found that such state control was in
conflict with the desire Congress had that labor activities affecting inter-
state commerce, in the interest of uniformity, be controlled only by the
National Labor Relations Board. However, the Supreme Court was care-
ful to reserve to the states their right of traditional police power to con-
trol violence. It cited its previous holdings in labor cases where violence
or threat of violence21 was involved and said:
State jurisdiction has prevailed in these situations because the compelling state
interest, in the scheme of our federalism, in the maintenance of domestic peace
is not overridden in the absence of clearly expressed congressional direction.22
A case which expressly holds that the state may take jurisdiction over
labor activities when violence is involved is United Auto. Workers v.
WERB.23 Here the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board was allowed
to enjoin the pickets of the Kohler Company in Sheboygan, Wisconsin
because the pickets threatened those willing to work for the company
with bodily harm and denied free entrance and exit to the company's fac-
tory. This injunction was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court
even though the National Labor Relations Board could have granted the
same remedy. The majority opinion, therefore, concentrated on the vio-
lence and threats of violence involved. Mr. Justice Douglas, in the dis-
senting opinion, found no conflict in the fact that the states could control
violence, but found conflict in the fact that Wisconsin was being allowed
to grant a remedy, namely the enjoining of an unfair labor practice,
which he felt that Congress had intended to lie only with the National
Labor Relations Board. He agreed that the states may invoke their crimi-
nal statutes.
20 359 U.S. 236 (1959). 22 Id. at 247.
21 Ibid. 23 351 U.S. 266 (1956).
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Of course the States may control violence. They may make arrests and invoke
their criminal law to the hilt. They transgress only when they allow their ad-
ministrative agencies or their courts to enjoin the conduct that Congress has
authorized the federal agency to enjoin.24
Since the state in the present case is seeking to prevent violence by in-
voking its criminal law, it not only finds precedent in the majority opinion
of the Kohler case but it has the support of the dissent. Also, there is no
conflict with the dissent because the employer can obtain no preventative
relief from the National Labor Relations Board because the union organ-
izers are not involved in one of the enumerated unfair labor practices of
section 8 (b). 25 Therefore, there is no duplication of a like federal remedy
involved. However, in cases brought before the Board by unions alleging
unfair labor practices of employers, employer property rights have been
expressly recognized.26 In these cases, the unions were. petitioning the
Board because the employers had ejected nonemployee union organizers
from adjacent parking lots and factory doorways. The Board held that
where there was a valid no-solicitation rule, the organizers were tres-
passers and would be ejected as such. The leading case on nonemployee
union organizers, NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 27 came to the United
States Supreme Court on the same facts. Nonemployee union organizers
had been ejected from an adjacent company parking lot by the employers
and the union had obtained an injunction from the National Labor Rela-
tions Board to force the employers to cease this practice. Because the
United States Supreme Court found that there were other usual and
reasonable means available to the unions to reach the employees, the Su-
preme Court reversed the decree of the National Labor Relations Board
and held that section 7 required only that employers refrain from inter-
ference with the employees' exercise of their own rights. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court held that section 7 does not require the employer to per-
mit the use of its facilities for organization by nonemployees when other
means are readily available.28 These cases expressly acknowledge the
property rights of employers. However, these are empty rights if they
cannot be protected. Because, under the Labor Management Relations Act
of 1947,29 the distribution of union leaflets by nonemployee union organ-
241d. at 276 (dissenting opinion). (Emphasis added.)
25 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
158 (1958).
26 Marshall Field & Co. v. NLRB, 200 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1953); McKinney Lumber
Co., Inc., 82 N.L.R.B. 38 (1949), E. A. Labs., 88 N.L.R.B. 673 (1950).
27 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
28 Ibid.
29 (Taft-Hartley Act) 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 5 158 (1958).
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izers on an adjacent parking lot is not an unfair labor practice, the em-
ployer cannot obtain any preventative relief from the National Labor
Relations Board. Thus, if the state is not allowed to exercise its jurisdic-
tion, the employer owner or occupier must resort to self help for the
protection of his rights. As seen this creates a threat of violence to the
community. Since the United States Supreme Court has expressly recog-
nized the power of the states to control such threats,80 the State of Illinois
should be allowed to eliminate such a threat by the use of a criminal
statute designed for this purpose.
However, one of the elements of the Illinois criminal trespass statute3 '
is that a person be unlawfully upon the land of another. Thus, the Illinois
Supreme Court was presented with the question of whether the trespass
of the defendants in the Goduto case was justified or excused since non-
employee union organizers are sometimes protected by the National
Labor Relations Act.8 2 In the Babcock & Wilcox Co. case, the Supreme
Court stated that only in certain circumstances will the employers' prop-
erty rights give way before the rights guaranteed unions in section 7. One
such instance is where it can be shown that a no-solicitation rule is being
unfairly applied or is discriminatory. Another is when there is no reason-
able means of contacting employees, other than on the property of the
employer.83 In such a situation, nonemployee union organizers are pro-
tected by section 7. Interference with this activity is prohibited by section
8.34 The state courts do not have the power to decide when a no-solicita-
tion rule is being unfairly applied. Primary determination of such ques-
tions rests with the National Labor Relations Board,3 5 but the Board can-
not make such a determination unless the union applied to it alleging an
unfair labor practice on the part of the employer.36 This is the usual
procedure followed by unions in such cases,37 but there had been no such
30 United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954); United
Auto. Workers v. WERB, 351 U.S. 266 (1956); Youngdahl v. Rainfair Inc., 355 U.S. 131
(1957).
31111. Rev. Stat. ch. 38 § 565 (1959).
32 NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
83Ibid.
34Ibid.
35 Garner v. Teamsters Union, Local 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953); Weber v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955); Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957);
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
36 NLRB v. Hopwood Retinning Co., 98 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1938); Consumers Power
Co. v. NLRB, 113 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1940).
37NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 222 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1955); NLRB v. Seam-
prufe, Inc., 222 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1955); NLRB v. Ranco, Inc., 222 F.2d 543 (6th
Cir. 1955); NLRB v. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 277 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1960).
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petition by the defendants in the Goduto case. Therefore, the point in
issue is whether or not the Illinois state courts can convict the defendants
of trespass without a prior determination by the National Labor Relations
Board of their right to be on the property. Because the defendants did not
follow the procedure established by Congress to protect their rights, the
Illinois Supreme Court held that they could exercise jurisdiction. This
seems to be the logical decision, for to deny the jurisdiction of the states
because of the unions' failure to apply for a determination of its rights
would make the states' interest in the prevention of violence subject to the
course of action decided upon by the labor union. The cases have re-
peatedly held that the states' interest in the safety of the public and pre-
vention of violence is predominant.""
Therefore, the Illinois courts properly took jurisdiction over the acts
of the defendants in the Goduto case because their repeated refusals con-
stituted a threat of violence to the community. Furthermore, although the
Illinois state courts did not have the power to determine whether or not
the defendants' trespass was excused under section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act, the defendants were properly convicted because of their
failure to apply to the National Labor Relations Board for a determination
of their rights. This follows since the rights of the states to control vio-
lence have been held to take precedence over rights granted labor unions
in section 7.39 It was the course of action decided upon by the labor
union which created the situation where their rights under section 7
could not be determined. It would be incongruous to find that the state's
interest in the protection of the public was subject to the course of action
decided upon by the labor unions, since the states have a duty to protect
the peace and order of society.40
88 United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954); United
Auto. Workers v. WERB, 351 U.S. 266 (1956); Youngdahl v. Rainfair Co., 355 U.S.
131 (1957).
89 Ibid.
40 A petition for certiorari in the case of People v. Goduto is presently pending
before the United States Supreme Court. 30 U.S.L. Week 3097 (U.S. Sept. 22, 1961)
(No. 437).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY LAW
AS A DEPRIVATION OF DUE PROCESS
The defendant, a resident of Colorado, was involved in an automobile
accident while driving within the state. Within a one year period after
the first accident, the defendant was involved in a second in which he was
charged with driving while under a license suspension order issued by the
